

MONEY-LAUNDERING

Case Studies



Colonel t.SPEF Giuseppe Lopez

GUARDIA DI FINANZA



Guardia di Finanza Special Currency Police Unit



Operation "Precious Affairs"

Guardia di Finanza

Operation "Precious Affairs"



Close link between robberies and thefts carried out in Palermo (in the area controlled by the **Porta Nuova mafia mandamento**) and the subsequent initiatives of money laundering.

Cosa Nostra had a strict control of the territory before and after the crimes:

- Criminal activities could be carried out only after an express authorization under **penalty** of economic or corporal sanctions;
- For the transfer of stolen goods criminals were obliged to contact a single **operator** (ALFA Ltd).


In this way, according to **informant's** declarations, the members of the mafia association were able to:

- identify all the thieves and robbers operating in the area to verify if they had acted with prior authorization from the mafia and to order them to hand over part of the stolen goods (or the relative value);
- prevent the commission of predatory crimes against "protected" subjects;
- where deemed useful, order and have crimes carried out against victims designated by the association itself;
- make profits on stolen valuables, asking ALFA Ltd for a percentage of the total value.

Operation "Precious Affairs"



1ST PHASE



**TRAFFIC
OFF THE
BOOKS**

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
Operation "Precious Affairs"




They changed often and they systematically reported their account books and IT devices stolen

PURCHASE OFF THE BOOKS AND FAKE INVOICES

2ND PHASE



Operation "Precious Affairs"



- Wiretapping (about 50 targets) **phone contracts registered to immigrants, used as intercoms, use of different phones to change the IMEI**
- Local audio surveillance (POS and MODEM)
- Vehicle audio surveillance (about 15 vehicles)
- Data surveillance through Trojans (about 5 phones) **iOS is an issue**
- Video surveillance (about 20 targets)
- Financial investigations (about 25 subjects)
- Development of Suspicious Activity Reports
- Stakeouts, tailings and inspections
- Anti-money laundering checks
- Checks at the Chamber of Commerce, Municipality, Agents and Intermediaries Body, Bank of Italy, Provincial Police Headquarters
- Searches and seizures of both documentary and IT material

The overall investigative activity made it possible to report to the Judicial Authority over **100 subjects** responsible for the crimes of:

- **external complicity in a mafia association** (articles 110 and 416-bis of the Criminal Code);
- **money laundering aggravated by having facilitated the activity of the mafia organization Cosa Nostra** (articles 648-bis and 416-bis.1 of the Criminal Code);
- **self-laundering** (art. 648-ter.1 of the Criminal Code);
- **receiving stolen goods** (art. 648 of the Criminal Code).

On 21st April 2022, also thanks to the declarations of an informer, personal precautionary measures were executed against 5 subjects (**3 custodies in prison, 2 house arrests**), as well as **preventive seizures for equivalent** for approximately **28 million euros**, concerning, among other things, 7 companies operating in the gold trade sector and 10 bank accounts.



- Apart from ordinary tools for serious crimes: wiretapping, searches, seizures
- Undercover operations
- Direct confiscation of the proceeds (preventive seizures)
- Confiscation for equivalent of the proceeds (preventive seizures)
- Extended confiscation of not justified assets (preventive seizures)
- Preventive asset measures (administrative sanction decided by the Criminal Court)



Guardia di Finanza Special Currency Police Unit



Operation “Land of Fires”

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STARTING POINT OF THE INVESTIGATION



Tax audit by GDF Tax Police Unit of Lucca (Tuscany) to a shoe company



Tax crimes proceeding and European Investigation Order to search the offices of their accountant in Sofia (Bulgaria)




The documents seized have been given to the GDF Investigation Group on Organized Crime of Florence to distribute relevant evidences to other Public Prosecutor Offices according to the links to different Criminal Organizations



Part of the documentation was related to an accountant of Caserta (Campania) already known for previous money laundering convictions

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION



CHANGE OF OUR FOCUS

Wiretapping and stakeouts confirmed the actuality of the relations of the new target with *Casalesi's* clan

The target was managing various figureheads that have the task to register companies and accounts in their names to issue fake invoices and launder the dirty money of the clan

One of his close «friends» was a building contractor, that call often the target to meet him in person

The building contractor, in turn, was managing various figureheads in the same way, as if he had acquired the know-how

FURTHER CHANGE OF OUR FOCUS

new wiretapping focused on the building contractor revealed suspicious contacts with the de facto administrator of a waste disposal company (who can't reveal his role because subject to an **antimafia prohibition sanction**, because his previous waste disposal company resulted to be to the service of the *Casalesi's* clan, in order to take illicit advantage of public contracts)

In particular the organized confidential meetings in which we supposed the building contractor handed cash resulting from previous bank transfers made by the waste disposal company

cash deliveries have been confirmed by financial investigations (bank transfers form the waste disposal company to companies controlled by the building contractor and consequent withdraws of cash and meetings)

CONNECTION WITH OTHER CASE



Following our investigations, thanks to the coordination of the Public Prosecutor Office we discovered that there was another ongoing case focused on the waste disposal company for environmental crimes



In this way we had access to other evidences already acquired, in particular the records made thanks to a Trojan in the smartphone of the de facto administrator



We were so able to confirm that: invoices issued by the building contractor were fake; after the invoices followed bank transfers for the same value; after the bank transfers followed the return in cash of 78% of the invoices value



Investigation verified with GPS tracking and stakeouts the illicit transport and disposal of waste coming from Calabria (territory controlled by ‘Ndrangheta) to a quarry in the Caserta province

THE MONEY LAUNDERING SCHEME

Considering the illicit waste disposal and the fraudulent tax returns as predicate offences, we reconstructed a significant money-laundering scheme

In the period 2020-2021 4 building companies issued fake invoices to **8 millions euros** of value, followed by regular bank transfers

From those 4 companies, always thanks to fake invoices, money was transferred to 12 companies, divided in 2 specific groups

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THE MONETIZATION

7 building companies, all controlled by the same building contractor, have been used to withdraw cash (78%) that has been returned to the de facto administrator of the waste disposal company

ITALIAN CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS USE OFTEN VERY NUMEROUS FIGUREHEADS TO SPLIT THE CASH WITHDRAWS

5 companies (construction, ceremonies and events management, advertisement, detergents trade) are used instrumentally to send money to China, while in parallel the Chinese community of Naples delivers same amounts in cash (as confirmed by the tapped calls of the building contractor)

IN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF INVESTIGATIONS WE DETECTED AN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OC AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY (CASH IN CHANGE OF BANK TRANSFERS JUSTIFIED BY FAKE INVOICES)

THE PROFIT OF MONEY-LAUNDERING



22% of the laundered money (through his companies and Chinese community), profit of the laundering, has been transferred to foreign bank accounts belonging to the building contractor and his figureheads (Lithuania, United Kingdom, Poland, Belgium, Germany, Estonia and Bulgaria)



RESULTS

At the end of the investigation personal precautionary measures were executed against 8 subjects (**2 custodies in prison, 6 house arrests**), as well as **preventive seizures for equivalent** for approximately **21 million euros**, concerning, among other things, the company operating in the waste disposal, various shares and bank accounts, 8 luxury cars (Ferrari Roma, Lamborghini Urus, Porsche Macan, etc.).





Guardia di Finanza Special Currency Police Unit



Operation "Swiss Laundromat"

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Operation "Swiss Laundromat"



Swiss credit institution providing to Italian entrepreneurs management and investment services, across the border, for large amounts of money coming from tax crimes and bankruptcy frauds.

The Swiss credit institution is part of a group comprising a bank and a fiduciary service company in Milan, that were used occasionally as office and to find new customers.




Relationship
Manager


Unauthorized financial intermediaries

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Operation “Swiss Laundromat”



*Focus on **a property sale** where part of the real price was hidden thanks to the help of a relationship manager who structured a foreign-to-foreign bank transfer*



*Analysing more than **700 STRs** related to voluntary disclosure requests involving the Swiss private bank, around **80 customers** were identified*

In particular those customers that:

- disclosed more than 100.000 euros;*
- held a personal account in the Italian bank controlled by the Swiss private bank;*
- called the relationship managers identified by VD requests*

- Exam of the VD accompanying reports;*
- Access to the Special Section of Tax Register to identify relevant bank accounts;*
- Analysis of phone records and called the relationship managers and cell towers.*

Operation “Swiss Laundromat”



Acquisition of witness information by identified customers



Wiretapping the relationship managers phones as well as audio surveillance of their vehicles



Stakeouts and audio surveillance at the places where they met customers



Searches of their houses and in the Italian bank controlled by the Swiss private bank and data acquisition from PCs, tablets, smartphones and bank server

Operation “Swiss Laundromat”


Thanks to witness information, WhatsApp messages and wiretapped calls the following money-laundering modus operandi was identified



set up maintained banking relationships in favor of Italian customers, using measures, such as for example **numbered accounts**, functional to shield the identity of the beneficial owner or his status as an Italian taxpayer, also placing **financial products** and carrying out **asset management services**



transferred the money to and from Italy in cash paying a 2% commission



shielded the effective ownership of financial relationships, through the creation and use of **Panamanian companies, trusts, foundations, figureheads...**



made available the money allowing loans secured by pledges on the customers' securities portfolio held and managed by the bank itself

They managed in this way more than 900 millions of euros



Guardia di Finanza Special Currency Police Unit



Operation "Banglatown"

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Operation “Banglatown”



INPUT FROM PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF ROME



CARRY OUT AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL PHENOMENON FOR ANY CRIMINALLY RELEVANT PROFILES TO BE ATTACKED



Preparation of an «Analysis of Aggregate Reports by Phenomenon» (ASAF) document, aimed at examining the economic and financial profiles linked to the settlement of the **Bangladeshi community in the capital**, which has grown exponentially in recent years with a significant number of active business activities on the Capitoline territory and a substantial **flow of remittances abroad, via the money transfer**

La comunità in sintesi



145.707

Cittadini bangladesi regolarmente soggiornanti
al 7° posto per numero di presenze

3,9% del totale dei non comunitari



27,7%
donne



72,3%
uomini

30.395


minori di 18 anni
269 minori non accompagnati



17.745 alunni bangladesi (+12,4%)
394 iscritti a corsi di laurea


29,2% Lazio
15,4% Lombardia
13,8% Veneto

55,9%
soggiornanti
di lungo periodo



44,1% permessi
a scadenza

■ Lavoro
■ Famiglia
■ Altri motivi




61% tasso di occupazione
84,2% maschile 9,1% femminile

26,2% occupati
nel settore **Commercio**

36% lavoratori addetti alle vendite


4° posto per numero di imprese individuali (8,2%)




31.264 titolari di impresa individuali (+0,5%)
6,7% imprenditrici albanesi (+8,1%)

64% imprese nel **Commercio e Trasporti**

Operation "Banglatown"



FLOWS OF REMITTANCES ABROAD YEAR 2018



Seizure of a payment institution
and six *money transfer agencies*
July 2020

**Illegal transfers to
Bangladesh worth 20
million euros reconstructed,**
also aimed at fraudulently
embezzling taxes in Italy



Operation "Banglatown"



Pursuant to **art. 49, paragraph 2, of D.Lgs. no. 231/2007**, the **transfer of funds through "money transfers" is prohibited for amounts equal to or greater than €1,000.00**, even when made with multiple payments, below the threshold, which appear **artificially split**.

Pursuant to **art. 1**, paragraph 2, letter v) of Legislative Decree 231/2007, **a fractional operation is defined as** *"a unitary operation in terms of economic value, of an amount equal to or greater than the limits established in this decree, carried out through multiple operations, individually lower than the aforementioned limits, carried out at different times and in a limited period of time set at **seven days**, without prejudice to the existence of the split operation when there are precise elements to consider it as such"*




The described **illicit operation** of the artificial splitting of money transfer operations, from a sanctioning point of view:

- constitutes an **administrative offence**, committed by the *money transfer agent* punished with an administrative fine of between 3,000.00 and 50,000.00 euros;
- integrates the **crime** referred to in **art. 55 paragraph 3** of the AML decree which punishes *anyone who, being obliged, pursuant to this decree, to provide the data and information necessary for the purposes of adequate customer verification, provides false data or untruthful information, is punished with imprisonment from six months to three years and with a fine from 10,000 euros to 30,000 euros*".

The untruthful information would be precisely that referring to the identification data of the subjects (unknowing and/or compliant or non-existent third parties) to whom the agent attributes the formal execution of the individual artificially divided operations

Operation “Banglatown”

Sums divided into several amounts by fictitiously attributing ownership of the financial transaction to unaware third parties, family members, friends and/or compliant acquaintances (mostly without earning capacity), or by resorting to the use of multiple circuits *money transfer*.



Operation "Banglatown"



Operation “Banglatown”

MULTI-IP FRACTIONAL


OPERATION	OPERATION	SENDER NAME	BENEFICIARY NAME	AMOUNT SENT	PAYMENT INSTITUTION
30/03/16	13:03:19	SENDER_1	ABDUL ALAM	992.00	ALFA
30/03/16	13:51:29	SENDER_1	ABDUL ALAM	992.00	BETA
30/03/16	13:59:59	SENDER_2	ABDUL ALAM	992.00	BETA
30/03/16	3.05.50pm	SENDER_2	ABDUL ALAM	992.00	ALFA
30/03/16	15:18:27	SENDER_1	ABDUL ALAM	992.50	GAMMA
30/03/16		SENDER_1	ABDUL ALAM	999.00	DELTA

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Operation “Banglatown”

SINGLE-IP SPLITTING

OPERATION	OPERATION	SENDER NAME	BENEFICIARY NAME	AMOUNT SENT	PAYMENT INSTITUTION
22/11/16	18:03:18	SENDER_1	ABDUL ALAM	992.98	ALFA INSTITUTE
22/11/16	18:10:36	SENDER_2	ABDUL ALAM	992.98	ALFA INSTITUTE
22/11/16	18:15:07	SENDER_3	ABDUL ALAM	992.98	ALFA INSTITUTE
22/11/16	18:18:06	SENDER_4	ABDUL ALAM	992.98	ALFA INSTITUTE



Examination of the tax and income positions of many owners of these commercial activities, identified through surveillance and verification as the real senders of the transferred sums.

In the face of significant transactions, systematic failures to pay taxes have emerged **with registrations of the related tax debts**, despite the presence of the relevant tax returns. Variable tax debts were established for each trader, ranging between 10.000 and 300.000 euros.

By doing so, the Bangladeshi traders, deprived of any other movable and immovable property on which the State could claim a standard of living even higher than the declared incomes, have removed the only financial guarantee available from possible forced execution by the Treasury, consisting of cash.



Operation "Evolution"



Guardia di Finanza

Operation "Evolution"

63 personal precautionary measures carried out
(11 in prison, 37 under house arrest, 15
interdiction measures)

MAXI MONEY LAUNDERING
FOR OVER 100 MILLION
EUROS
RESULT OF SYSTEMATIC AND
MASSIVE TAX FRAUD



THE "SAFE" OF THE "CASALESI CLAN" REBUILT

The investigative activity originates from investigations delegated by the Public Prosecutor's Office - D.D.A. of Naples on large flows of money coming from companies involved in tax fraud and found to be at the service of the Camorra clan of the "Casalesi"

Operation "Evolution"

The activity carried out allowed us to identify a large and organised money laundering system, structured on multiple levels, within which a large group of people, the so-called "changers", operated on a daily basis, transferring huge sums of money to postal current accounts or Postepay Evolution cards, which were then withdrawn in cash, often on the same day, by specially appointed and paid individuals, making it difficult to identify their origin.

The pyramid structure created for the sole purpose of carrying out money laundering was composed as follows:

33 "shell" companies, mostly Italian, but also under foreign law, operating in the sectors of trade in packaging and petroleum products, which arranged transfers of large amounts in favour of natural and legal persons, the so-called "filter companies".

18 "filter" companies and individual firms operating, among other things, in the sector of trade in packaging and car accessories, which, having received the aforementioned transfers, transferred the related liquidity - through further transfers of a smaller amount, certified cheques and money orders - to the "downstream" subjects

44 individuals, some of whom were owners of individual businesses, "responsible" for converting money into cash, who withdrew almost daily, at post offices in the provinces of Naples and Caserta, sums of money in cash credited by bank transfers to postal current accounts and Postepay cards registered in their names

THE FLOW OF MONEY

Companies engaged in VAT and excise tax evasion

BANK TRANSFERS AGAINST INVOICES FOR NON-EXISTENT TRANSACTIONS



Upstream shell companies

BANK TRANSFERS AGAINST INVOICES FOR NON-EXISTENT TRANSACTIONS OR FOR FICTITIOUS ADVANCE PAYMENTS



Filter companies and firms

BANK TRANSFERS TO POSTAL ACCOUNTS OR TOP-UPS OF POSTEPAY CARDS



Individuals "Changers"

WITHDRAWALS AT POST OFFICES OR POSTAMAT ATMS




Collectors for the "Casalesi"

DELIVERY OF CASH

Operation "Evolution"

The sums withdrawn, equal to approximately 55,000 euros per day and 1.6 million per month (approximately €80 million from January 2016 to January 2020), were returned in cash, during specific meetings, to members of the Camorra association called "Clan dei Casalesi", in order to provide for the maintenance of several families of prisoners of the same Clan.





Guardia di Finanza ***Special Currency Police Unit***

Operation ***"Lady Luck"***



Guardia di Finanza

Instant lottery "Scratch and win"

Aggravated fraud, unauthorized access to a computer system, receiving stolen goods and self-laundering

12 individuals under investigation, including 6 **Lottomatica employees** and former employees

Preventive seizures for 27 million euros, linked to the collection of 4 **"Scratch and Win" tickets**



LOTTOMATICA

Origin of the service

Suspicious transaction report from a credit institution

Significant Scratch and Win Lottery win. Given the importance of the sums, the role of the winners (apparently **all Lottomatica employees**), the intersection of geographical areas (**ticket purchased in Cremona, Roman winners**, lawyer who was appointed to collect the sum from the Locri Court), it was considered to forward a report



Reasons for suspicion

Suspicious transaction report from a credit institution

«On **05.28.2019**, **Mr. X** showed up at the agency expressing his desire to open a current account in his name with the aim of **channeling an important winning together with 3 other friends/colleagues**. After a few days the aforementioned **GUY communicated that he had appointed a lawyer...** according to him, a very dear and long-standing friend of the utmost trust, to collect the sums, presenting as proof **"contract for the provision of intellectual work"**, asking if it was possible - also for prompt verification - opening of a current account in the name of the aforementioned lawyer for the collection of the winnings at the same branch. As provided in the aforementioned contract, the sum won was credited to the current account opened **by Lawyer Y** resident in Roccella Jonica, who arranged **no. 4 transfers of Euro 1,463,537 in favor of the winners**, n. 1 transfer of Euro 160,000 for donation to a non-profit organization, n. 1 bank transfer of Euro 125,000 to the Lawyer... **the sums are still available to him**

**Description
of
suspicious
operation**

Suspicious transaction report from a credit institution

- *"From the regulations of the aforementioned Scratch Card it appears that **the probability of winning the first prize of 7 million euros is equal to 1 in every 15,840,000 tickets** for a total of 2 winning tickets out of the initial lot of 31,680,000 tickets".*
- *Lottomatica's code of conduct expressly provides that "all employees and consultants based in Italy **are prohibited** from participating in gaming activities in the country".*

**FIU
technical
report**

...open sources searches

Record win at the tobacconist in Cremona

A customer won seven million euros by purchasing a twenty-euro scratch card... The win should date back to last week. **"He scratched it here in the tobacconist" said the owner, "he was very calm because we didn't notice anything. It's much more likely that he scratched it at home"**. "Yesterday Carini received a call from the Lottomatica area representative who told him the news. Once the winner shows up at the bank, the same bank reports the win to Lottomatica, which in turn notifies, via the code on the winning ticket, the tobacconist where it was sold"





LOTTOMATICA

Lottomatica operates in the **national regulated gaming market in the following sectors**: lotteries (online, traditional and instant - e.g. Scratch Cards and Lotto, 10eLotto and national lotteries); products and services for the entertainment machine market; sport bets; interactive games (multi-channel entertainment services such as bingo, poker, casino games); commercial services (services not related to lotteries, such as telephone top-ups and tax payments).

The company operates both as an **exclusive concessionaire** - **for certain games such as instant** and traditional lotteries - and as a non-exclusive concessionaire for games such as sports betting and entertainment machines

Operation “Lady Luck”



Scratch and Win production, research
through open sources

***The brains in charge of dispensing millions of euros**, ...is the futuristic computer that coordinates the printing of the "Scratch and Win" tickets, which distributes the prize money by producing the lucky coupons and scattering them in the boxes destined for the points of sale. It obeys the autopilot of a strict encrypted algorithm, not human orders and their possible temptations; **it remains immune to hacker attacks because it is not connected to the internet**, it defends itself from physical intrusions **thanks to 64 cameras** with motion detectors that continue to record even when the power goes out. Or someone blows it up... omitted... The boxes leave from Florida and reach Livorno or Civitavecchia by sea in about three weeks: «*Only at their destination*» continues the manager «*when they leave our national warehouses and arrive in bars, tobacconists, Autogrills and other distributors, they are activated and are payable to players*»*

Operation "Lady Luck"

Further preliminary checks via databases

It is found that the 4 subjects are Lottomatica employees

Twenty years of experience also in the IT field

Which operational line to follow????



....Preliminary criminal report

Hypothesis of aggravated fraud

Since it cannot be ruled out that, by working for the holding company of the Lottomatica group, they may have artfully obtained privileged information (also due to their IT knowledge) such as to circumvent the "*normal course of the game*", so as to identify "*the series number of the cards and the relevant point of sale*", obtaining a win that otherwise "*would not have occurred*", thus generating a deceptive activity aimed at obtaining an "*unfair profit*"



Preliminary criminal report

Requests to the Judicial Authority

Telephone records of the 4 subjects, in order to understand the actual position and/or connection between the four "*Lottomatica*" employees at the time of purchasing the winning ticket and immediately after the win

Bank checks

Accommodated database, in order to find out whether the interested parties used accommodation facilities (hotels/B&Bs/others) in the Cremona area and surrounding areas during the period of the millionaire win



Opening model 44

Feedback and second criminal report

The location where the winning ticket was purchased, i.e. **Cremona**, does not appear to be habitually frequented by any of the suspects, as emerged from the **information acquired from the "Alloggiati" database**, from the company "Autostrade per l'Italia SpA" and from the analysis of the telephone traffic records

Only one person went to this location to get hold of the winning ticket on **08.04.2019**

This person went from Rome to Cremona for the time strictly necessary to obtain the winning ticket. The analysis of the "cells" to which the subject's mobile user was connected revealed that he arrived in the Lombardy province on the night of **08.04.2019** and left for Rome before 2.00 pm the following day (**09.04.2019**)



Results of investigations

Operation "Lady Luck"



Second criminal report

Series of investments in stocks and insurance policies


Hypothesis of self-laundering of illicit proceeds



New requests to the Judicial Authority

Technical investigations

Acquisition of information at Lottomatica



Opening model 21

... Further elements emerged

One of the subjects has the role of Logistics Manager of the Scratch Cards sector; the other three are part of a single Team, **in possession of the administration passwords to access the game management system, therefore acting as "System Administrators"**



ADR: Specifico che gli Amministratori di sistema possono accedere a tutti i dati sensibili concernenti il settore del Gratta & Vinci ferma restando l'impossibilità di lettura di alcuni dati in quanto cifrati. Dagli stessi viene sottoscritta una specifica lettera di incarico nella quale vengono esplicitate le responsabilità alle quali incorrono in caso di utilizzo indebito di tali dati.

ADR: Preciso che gli Amministratori di sistema hanno accesso, quotidianamente, alle seguenti informazioni che possono utilizzare al fine di creare *report* funzionali alle altre strutture: n. di biglietti in magazzino, n. di biglietti distribuiti ai punti vendita, n. di biglietti validati vincenti e quindi anche il valore dei premi incassati e quanti biglietti vincenti non sono stati ancora pagati nella sua globalità.



Operation “Lady Luck”

... Further elements emerged

Evidence of presence in the office of **Mr. X, absent on 9 April 2019**



DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	08/04/2019 08:42	Entrance
DUDE	12184	CB56 TORN REC	08/04/2019 12:59	Exit
DUDE	12184	CB56 TORN REC	08/04/2019 13.54	Entrance
DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	08/04/2019 16:22	Exit
DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	10/04/2019 08:42	Entrance
DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	10/04/2019 12:52	Exit
DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	10/04/2019 14.05	Entrance
DUDE	12184	CB56 DRIVEWAY TURNING	10/04/2019 16:41	Exit



Guardia di Finanza

Operation "Lady Luck"

... Further elements emerged

The history of the package containing the winning ticket has been reconstructed: physically packaged on **8 April 2019** at **11.16 am** and arrived at the tobacconist in Cremona on **9 April 2019 at 10.19**



Somma di PACCHI_IN_STOCK (B) Etichette di colonna																
Etichette di riga		02-apr	03-apr	04-apr	05-apr	06-apr	07-apr	08-apr	09-apr	10-apr	11-apr	12-apr	13-apr	14-apr	15-apr	
1095			4,6	4,4	4,2	4,2	3,2	3	3	6	1,8	1,4	7	6,6	6	5,6
3M1171			4,6	4,4	4,2	4,2	3,2	3	3	6	1,8	1,4	7	6,6	6	5,6
Totale complessivo			4,6	4,4	4,2	4,2	3,2	3	3	6	1,8	1,4	7	6,6	6	5,6

MITTENTE 0632910 000

L.F. S.R.L. INFOLINE 800-888888
VIA DELLE MANICHELLE SNC
00040 ROMA

Mitt. Originale c/o sede Arianna 2001 spa

DESTINATARIO: CARLINI ROBERTO
CORSO VITTORIO EMANUELE II 92
26100 CREMONA

FILELE DI ARRIVO 036

IMP. RETRIBUTE 3051171

SPEDIZIONE 114 68 838119 8/04/2019

TELEFONO E NOMINATIVO CARLINI ROBERTO

DOCUMENTO NON VALIDO AI FINI FISCALI

NATURA DELLA MERCE: 31 LOTTERY

DATA CONSEGNA RICHIESTA

CONSEGNA AD UFFICI

9/04/2019 10:19

Spedizione: 191146809081198 Distributa: 036-053951 (G)

Test parcel delivery

When the suspect **Mr. X** purchased the winning ticket on 9 April, **the Cremona tobacconist received 3 packs of Supercash tickets, and then sold 70% of the total packs present in the business on that date**

Guardia di Finanza

... Further elements emerged

At the retailer in Cremona, the prizes relating to the additional winning tickets (no. 4 with winnings of **€20, €25, €20 and €50**) present within the same package were also collected at very close times and validated by the system before the winning ticket of 7,000,000 euros.



CODICE_LOTTERIA	NUMERO_PACCO	NUMERO_BIGLIETTO	DATA_PAGAMENTO	IMPORTO_VINTO	PUNTO_VENDITA_VENDITORE	PUNTO_VENDITA_PAGANTE	DATA_INVIO	DATAORA_PAGAMENTO
1095	2653114	5	09/04/2019	20	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:46
1095	2653114	13	09/04/2019	25	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:47
1095	2653114	6	09/04/2019	50	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:48
1095	2653115	14	09/04/2019	20	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:47
1095	2653115	12	09/04/2019	20	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:47
1095	2653115	4	09/04/2019	25	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:48
1095	2653115	2	09/04/2019	50	3MI1171	3MI1171	10/04/2019	09/04/2019 11:48
1095	2653115	7	19/06/2019	7000000	3MI1171	1400001	20/06/2019	19/06/2019 14:44



Guardia di Finanza

... Further elements emerged

The same - using company servers about to be decommissioned - have developed and used software capable of seeking the validation of winning tickets through "*simulations*" carried out in the "*staging*" environment, which reproduces this process without affecting the system of production

Lottomatica carries out its own internal system consultancy to reconstruct access to the systems

The deletion of numerous access log-ons was found



Operation "Lady Luck"



Further elements emerged

In the intercepted conversations, the suspects themselves admit to having carried out "*manipulations*" on servers about to be decommissioned and to have subsequently carried out "**cleaning**" operations on the company IT system and precisely on the aforementioned "*staging*" system where they were carried out the most incisive operations "**but it's okay Staging you did well... that's where we dismantled... it's better that shit doesn't fit**".

Between the lines of a dialogue dated **06.05.2020**, it is revealed: "**there is no backup there anyway so we really cleaned everything... right there...**".

"then oh... then you have to think about it... look, at the end of this month it will be 12 months eh! [...] no... at the end of this month a year has passed



Subsequent investigative developments

Request and execution of preventive seizure by the GIP in July 2020 for aggravated fraud

Focus on a new person, namely the former Scratch and Win Team Leader, who left the company in 2017


Focus on the second Scratch and Win Super Cash lottery ticket worth 7 million euros

Separate criminal proceedings opened

Bank investigations and technical investigations



Operation "Lady Luck"





**Thanks for
your
attention**

Col. †.SPEF Giuseppe Lopez